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1 Introduction
When societies ask their members to vote, diﬀerent voters have reason to
view diﬀerent alternatives under diﬀerent lights. Some may care a lot for
some of the issues, and not for others. Some may be aware of diﬀerences
that others can hardly perceive. Some may be strongly aﬀected by measures
which are irrelevant for the life of others. Diﬀerences in opinion, information
and interest are only three of the reasons why not everyone attaches the same
importance to all of the choices faced by society. This is the reason why we
want to model classes of voting situations where the sets of preferences which
are admissible for some voter are diﬀerent from those that one can expect
from others. More speciﬁcally, we emphasize the asymmetries in individual
preferences that result from the fact that some voters may systematically
rank some alternatives as being indiﬀerent, while other voters may be able
to sharply distinguish between them, and to express strong preferences in
their regard.
Speciﬁcally, we shall consider preference domains where each agent is
characterized by a partition of the set of alternatives. Each set in the par-
tition of an agent includes those alternatives that will always be indiﬀerent
to each other, from the viewpoint of this voter. Indiﬀerence stands here to
express a number of circumstances that could be diﬀerentiated in other con-
texts, but that become equivalent for our analysis of the majority rule. Two
alternatives will be treated as necessarily indiﬀerent if it is the case that the
agent will never prefer one above the other, whether this is due to lack of
interest, opinion or information.
Although details will be provided later, let us emphasize that we are not
characterizing a speciﬁc preference domain, but a family of such. Each of the
domains in the family will be speciﬁed once a partition of the set of alter-
natives is attributed to each voter, satisfying for each triple of alternatives
one of two joint conditions on the partition. Roughly speaking, these con-
ditions express the requirement that the classes of alternatives for which we
allow voters to be indiﬀerent must be interrelated among each other. Any
triple of alternatives may be “free” for some agents, admitting the ranking of
the three by these voters in any order. However, the required interrelations
among partitions of alternatives for diﬀerent agents must be such that, even-
tually, the existence of these “free triples” does not disrupt the eﬀectiveness
of majority voting.
Our main result is that any partition satisfying our conditions deﬁnes
a family of preference proﬁles under which majority rule is always quasi-
transitive. Therefore, we characterize a family of domain restrictions, based
on the distribution of indiﬀerences across members of society, under which
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one can guarantee that Condorcet winners always exist. Since our condition
deﬁnes a wide variety of possible environments, we hope that authors may
ﬁnd the opportunity to specialize their models in a variety of ways that ﬁt
our general pattern. But we are already in position to suggest a number of
applications.
For a ﬁrst example, consider an election in which the candidates are
linearly ordered, from left to right. Any agent is eligible as a candidate,
and is entitled to decline the position if eventually elected. It is therefore
interesting to establish not only a winner, but also a list of alternates in case of
resignation. Each agent has then one neighbor to his left, and one to his right
(except for those at the extremes, who only have one neighbor). We allow
each agent to freely order himself and its immediate neighbors. Some agent
may prefer to be elected rather than seeing his neighbors elected. Others may
prefer their neighbor to the right (or left) to be the winner. Likewise, second
and third positions in the ranking are free. Hence, our preferences allow for
free triples of alternatives. Yet, we also assume that agents cannot clearly
distinguish between a victory by their neighbor in the right and the victory
of any other candidate in the same direction (this may be due to myopia, or
else result from rational calculations). He is indiﬀerent among all candidates
to his right, and also among all candidates to his left. In this example, then,
each agent has (at most) three indiﬀerence classes: all people to the left of
the voter form a class, all people to the right of the voter form a second class,
and the voter himself is a third class. These classes can be ordered in any
possible way. We shall prove that if all agents have preferences of this type,
the majority relation associated to any proﬁle of opinions by any number of
voters is quasi-transitive (i.e., the strict majorities among alternatives respect
transitivity). This is suﬃcient for the existence of Condorcet winners. It also
allows to guarantee the existence of path independent selections (Plott, 1973)
from the set of Condorcet winners: elections can be organized sequentially
without any fear for agenda manipulation.
Our example can be extended. The linear structure is unnecessarily nar-
row. Agents may be at the nodes of any tree. Therefore, each agent may
have a diﬀerent number of neighbors, as many as the number of branches
starting from or arriving to that node. An agent with k neighbors may now
freely rank k+1 classes of alternatives, including oneself as a singleton class.
Each of the remaining classes includes one neighbor and all other candidates
which are further out than this neighbor within the tree structure. This
is a very substantial extension of the domain: very perceptive people can
have many neighbors and thus freely rank many classes of candidates. Other
agents may be restricted by their positions to only rank a few groups. Many
structures are allowed, provided they can be represented by a tree, of any
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form. We later go further into the example based on a tree by connecting it
with a model recently discussed by Demange (2004).
These examples are rather special, and leave room for many other ap-
plications. Yet, the examples already suggest that the reasons for agents to
be indiﬀerent among sets of alternatives may come from diﬀerent sources,
ranging from technological to purely subjective, and may be associated to
asymmetries of diﬀerent sorts, which can be formalized through networks,
rankings or partitions. We are aware that in certain contexts it may be at-
tractive to distinguish between indiﬀerence and incompleteness when mod-
elling the inability or the lack of willingness of some agents to express a strict
preference between some pairs of alternatives. But we feel that this distinc-
tion would not lead to any substantial or operational gain in our context,
since expressing indiﬀerence or not expressing any preference are equivalent
for the workings of majority rule.
The paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, we present our model. In
Section 3, we state and prove the main result, and we show that the examples
we have brieﬂy presented are indeed instances where our condition holds. In
Section 4, we discuss the diﬀerences between our suggested domain restric-
tions and those previously considered by the literature on social choice and
political economy.
2 Agents and Preferences
Let N = {1, . . . , n} denote the ﬁnite set of agents and A the ﬁnite set of
alternatives. We always assume that |N | ≥ 3 and |A| ≥ 3. Agents have
preferences on the set of alternatives, which are given by complete, reﬂexive,
and transitive binary relations on A. The preference relation of agent i is
denoted by Ri, his strict preference relation by Pi and his indiﬀerence relation
by Ii. Let R denote the set of all complete, reﬂexive, and transitive binary
relations on A. A (preference) proﬁle is a list R = (Ri)i∈N specifying for each
agent i his preference relation Ri on A. Let RN denote the set of all proﬁles.
We consider the problem of society N having to choose a member from A.
For example, N is a committee or a faculty board having to elect a chair from
A. In such a situation an agent often does not have suﬃcient information
to distinguish between all members of A. In other words his preference
relation will express objective indiﬀerences, i.e., he views indiﬀerent any two
alternatives which he cannot distinguish. The objective indiﬀerences of agent
i are given by a partition Si of A. Then RSi is the set of all preference
relations respecting i’s objective indiﬀerences: for all Ri ∈ R:
Ri ∈ RSi ⇔ aIib for all a, b ∈ A such that {a, b} ⊆ S for some S ∈ Si.
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Note that the domain RSi does not exclude any subjective indiﬀerences of i
(given his objective indiﬀerences). We may want to rule out any indiﬀerences
between alternatives belonging to diﬀerent members of Si since agent i is able
to distinguish them. In other words, agent i’s preference will often be strict
for alternatives belonging to diﬀerent members of Si. Then PSi is the set of
all preference relations respecting i’s objective indiﬀerences and being strict
for any two alternatives which agent i is able to distinguish: for all Ri ∈ R:
Ri ∈ PSi ⇔ Ri ∈ RSi & aPib ∨ bPia for all a, b ∈ A such that {a, b} ⊆ S for all S ∈ Si.
Let S = (Si)i∈N denote the proﬁle of individual partitions of A, RS =
×i∈NRSi , and PS = ×i∈NPSi . We call RS the set of weak proﬁles which
are admissible under S and PS the set of strict proﬁles which are admissible
under S. A triple (of alternatives) is a subset of A containing exactly three
elements. We call a triple {a, b, c} free in Si if i is able to distinguish between
a, b and c, i.e., for all S ∈ Si, |S ∩ {a, b, c}| ≤ 1 (and agent i may rank the
alternatives a, b, and c in any conceivable way).
When Si is the ﬁnest partition, i can perfectly distinguish among all
alternatives. Many papers start from the domain of linear orderings and use
the results derived for the linear case for the whole set of weak orderings.
We cannot use this approach here since linear orderings are often ruled out
by S.
3 Quasi-Transitivity of the Majority Rule
Majority is one possibility for society to choose one alternative from A. Our
purpose is to identify necessary and suﬃcient conditions for quasi-transitivity
of the majority rule given the agents’ objective indiﬀerences. For each proﬁle
the majority relation is deﬁned as follows: given R ∈ RN and a, b ∈ A, its
majority (binary) relation, denoted by Rm, is deﬁned as
aRmb ⇔ |{i ∈ N | aPib}| ≥ |{i ∈ N | bPia}|. (1)
It is well known that the majority relation derived from an arbitrary pref-
erence proﬁle may be cyclic. When this occurs, the choices by majority are
not well deﬁned. We are thus particularly interested in conditions guaran-
teeing that this problem is avoided. For each proﬁle R, an alternative is a
(Condorcet) winner if it is not beaten (in the strict sense) by another alter-
native under the majority relation, i.e., a ∈ A is a (Condorcet) winner of
R if for all b ∈ A, aRmb. The existence of winners is guaranteed at those
proﬁles where the majority relation is quasi-transitive (i.e., the strict relation
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associated with the majority relation is transitive1). Formally, the majority
relation Rm is quasi-transitive if for all triples {a, b, c} the following holds:
aPmb & bPmc ⇒ aPmc.
Our basic result provides necessary and suﬃcient conditions for the quasi-
transitivity of majority rule on the set of strict proﬁles which are admissible
under the objective indiﬀerences S.
Deﬁnition 1 l Dichotomous Preferences (l DP). The partition proﬁle S
satisﬁes l DP for a triple {a, b, c} if at least l agents cannot distinguish two
alternatives in the triple, i.e., there is L ⊆ N such that |L| ≥ l and for each
i ∈ L there is some S ∈ Si with |S ∩ {a, b, c}| ≥ 2.
Our next property requires the following notation. Fix the partition pro-
ﬁle S and a triple {a, b, c} ∈ A. Let
N[ab] = {i ∈ N | for some S ∈ Si, {a, b} ⊆ S and c /∈ S}
denote the agents who cannot distinguish between a and b and who dis-
tinguish c from a and b. Similarly we deﬁne N[ac] and N[bc]. Also let
n[ab] = |N[ab]|, n[ac] = |N[ac]|, and n[bc] = |N[bc]|. Abusing language, we will
use the name “parity” to denote the property of a number being odd or even.
Deﬁnition 2 (n−2) Equal Parity Dichotomous Preferences ((n−2) EPDP).
The partition proﬁle S satisﬁes (n−2) EPDP for a triple {a, b, c} if it satisﬁes
(n − 2) DP and the numbers of agents, who cannot distinguish exactly two
alternatives in the triple, are either all even or all odd, i.e., the numbers n[ab],
n[ac], and n[bc] are either all even or all odd.
Theorem 1 Let S = (Si)i∈N . Then majority rule is quasi-transitive on the
domain PS if and only if S satisﬁes (n − 1) DP or (n − 2) EPDP for any
triple of alternatives.
Proof. Throughout the proof we ﬁx a triple {a, b, c} of A. Let N f{a,b,c}
denote the set of agents for whom {a, b, c} is free in Si, i.e., they may have
any ranking on {a, b, c}. Formally,
N f{a,b,c} = {i ∈ N | for all S ∈ Si, |S ∩ {a, b, c}| ≤ 1}.
Given a proﬁle R and x, y ∈ A, let NRxy = {i ∈ N |xPiy} denote the set of
agents who strictly prefer x to y under R.
1We have aPmb in (1) if the inequality is strict.
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(Only if) We show necessity. Suppose that the majority rule is quasi-transitive
on the domain PS and consider the triple {a, b, c}. We distinguish several
cases depending on the number of agents for whom the triple {a, b, c} is free.
Case 1: |N f{a,b,c}| ≤ 1.
Then for all i ∈ N\N f{a,b,c} there is some S ∈ Si such that
({a, b} ⊆ S) ∨ ({b, c} ⊆ S) ∨ ({a, c} ⊆ S).
Hence, S satisﬁes (n− 1) DP for {a, b, c}.
Case 2: |N f{a,b,c}| = 2.
Suppose that S does not satisfy (n−2) EPDP for {a, b, c}. By |N f{a,b,c}| =
2, S satisﬁes (n− 2) DP for {a, b, c} and either exactly one or exactly two of
the numbers n[ab], n[ac], and n[bc] are odd. Let N
f
{a,b,c} = {1, 2}.
First, without loss of generality, suppose that n[ac] is odd and n[ab] and
n[bc] are even. Let i ∈ N[ac]. Note that |N[ac]\{i}| is even. Then choose
R ∈ PS such that
(1) cP1aP1b; (2) aP2bP2c; (3) bPiaIic;
half of the agents in N[ac]\{i} strictly prefer a and c to b and the other half
of the agents in N[ac]\{i} strictly prefer b to a and c; half of the agents in
N[ab] strictly prefer a and b to c and the other half of the agents in N[ab]
strictly prefer c to a and b; and half of the agents in N[bc] strictly prefer b
and c to a and the other half of the agents in N[bc] strictly prefer a to b and
c. Now by construction, |NRab| > |NRba| and aPmb, |NRbc| > |NRcb| and bPmc,
and |NRac| ≤ |NRca| and cRma. Hence, majority rule is not quasi-transitive.
Second, without loss of generality, suppose that n[ab] and n[bc] are odd and
n[ac] is even. Let i ∈ N[ab] and j ∈ N[bc]. Note that |N[ab]\{i}| and |N[bc]\{j}|
are even. Then choose R ∈ PS such that
(1) cP1aP1b; (2) bP2cP2a; (3) aIibPic; (4) aPjbIjc;
half of the agents in N[ab]\{i} strictly prefer a and b to c and the other half
of the agents in N[ab]\{i} strictly prefer c to a and b; half of the agents in
N[bc]\{j} strictly prefer b and c to a and the other half of the agents in
N[bc]\{j} strictly prefer a to b and c; and half of the agents in N[ac] strictly
prefer a and c to b and the other half of the agents in N[ac] strictly prefer b to a
and c. Now by construction, |NRab| > |NRba| and aPmb, |NRbc| > |NRcb| and bPmc,
and |NRac| ≤ |NRca| and cRma. Hence, majority rule is not quasi-transitive.
Case 3: |N f{a,b,c}| is even and |N f{a,b,c}| ≥ 4.
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If either exactly one or exactly two of the numbers n[ab], n[ac], and n[bc] are
odd, then we derive a contradiction identically as in Case 2: we endow one
half of the agents in N f{a,b,c} with the preference relation of agent 1 in Case
2 and the other half of the agents in N f{a,b,c} with the preference relation of
agent 2 in Case 2.
Otherwise, let |N f{a,b,c}| = 2 + 2l and {1, 2, 3, 4} ⊆ N f{a,b,c}. Let
(1) cP1aP1b; (2) aP2bP2c; (3) aP3bP3c; (4) bP4cP4a.
First, suppose that all the numbers n[ab], n[ac], and n[bc] are even. Then
choose R ∈ PS such that (1)-(4) hold, l agents (including 1) in N f{a,b,c} have
agent 1’s preference relation, l agents (including 4) in N f{a,b,c} have agent 4’s
preference relation, half of the agents in N[ab] strictly prefer a and b to c and
the other half of the agents in N[ab] strictly prefer c to a and b; half of the
agents in N[bc] strictly prefer b and c to a and the other half of the agents in
N[bc] strictly prefer a to b and c; and half of the agents in N[ac] strictly prefer
a and c to b and the other half of the agents in N[ac] strictly prefer b to a and
c. Now by construction, |NRab| > |NRba| and aPmb, |NRbc| > |NRcb| and bPmc,
and |NRac| ≤ |NRca| and cRma. Hence, majority rule is not quasi-transitive.
Second, suppose that all the numbers n[ab], n[ac], and n[bc] are odd. Let
i ∈ N[ab], j ∈ N[bc], and k ∈ N[ac]. Note that |N[ab]\{i}|, |N[bc]\{j}|, and
|N[ac]\{k}| are even. Then choose R ∈ PS such that (1)-(4) hold, l agents
(including 1) in N f{a,b,c} have agent 1’s preference relation, l agents (including
4) in N f{a,b,c} have agent 4’s preference relation,
(5) cPiaIib; (6) aPjbIjc; (7) bPkaIkc;
half of the agents in N[ab]\{i} strictly prefer a and b to c and the other half
of the agents in N[ab]\{i} strictly prefer c to a and b; half of the agents
in N[bc]\{j} strictly prefer b and c to a and the other half of the agents
in N[bc]\{j} strictly prefer a to b and c; and half of the agents in N[ac]\{k}
strictly prefer a and c to b and the other half of the agents in N[ac]\{k} strictly
prefer b to a and c. Now by (5), (6), and (7), the agents i, j, and k oﬀset each
other for any binary comparison among a, b, and c. Thus, by construction,
|NRab| > |NRba| and aPmb, |NRbc| > |NRcb| and bPmc, and |NRac| ≤ |NRca| and
cRma. Hence, majority rule is not quasi-transitive.
Case 4: |N f{a,b,c}| is odd and |N f{a,b,c}| ≥ 3.
Let |N f{a,b,c}| = 3 + 2l and {1, 2, 4} ⊆ N f{a,b,c}. Similarly as in Case 3, we
endow agents 1, 2, and 4 with the same preferences as in Case 3, l agents
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in N f{a,b,c}\{1, 2, 4} with the preference relation of agent 1, and the other l
agents in N f{a,b,c}\{1, 2, 4} with the preference relation of agent 4.
If all the numbers n[ab], n[ac], and n[bc] have the same parity (they are
either all odd or all even), then we obtain a contradiction similarly as in
Case 3.
If exactly one of the numbers n[ab], n[ac], and n[bc] is odd, say n[bc], then
choose i ∈ N[bc] and let aPibIic. Note that |N[bc]\{i}| is even. Now similarly
to Case 3 we can show that majority rule is not quasi-transitive.
If exactly two of the numbers n[ab], n[ac], and n[bc] are odd, say n[bc] and
n[ac], then choose i ∈ N[bc] and j ∈ N[ac]. Let aPibIic and bPjaIjc. Note that
|N[bc]\{i}| and |N[ac]\{j}| are even. Now similarly to Case 3 we can show
that majority rule is not quasi-transitive.
(If) We show suﬃciency. Let R ∈ PS be such that aPmb and bPmc. We need
to show aPmc.
Note that for all i ∈ N[ab], aIibPic or cPiaIib. Thus, we have{
NRac ∩N[ab] = NRbc ∩N[ab]
NRca ∩N[ab] = NRcb ∩N[ab]
}
. (2)
Let k[ab] = |NRac ∩N[ab]| and k′[ab] = |NRca ∩N[ab]|. Similarly,{
NRac ∩N[bc] = NRab ∩N[bc]
NRca ∩N[bc] = NRba ∩N[bc]
}
. (3)
Let k[bc] = |NRac ∩N[bc]| and k′[bc] = |NRca ∩N[bc]|. Again similarly,{
NRab ∩N[ac] = NRcb ∩N[ac]
NRba ∩N[ac] = NRbc ∩N[ac]
}
. (4)
Let k[ac] = |NRab ∩N[ac]| and k′[ac] = |NRba ∩N[ac]|.
First, suppose that S satisﬁes (n− 1) DP for the triple {a, b, c}. Without
loss of generality, let N f{a,b,c} = {1} (the proof for the case N f{a,b,c} = ∅ follows
the same arguments).
We have NRab ⊆ (NRab∩N[bc])∪ (NRab∩N[ac])∪{1}. By aPmb, |NRab| > |NRba|.
Thus, from (3) and (4) we obtain
k[bc] + k[ac] ≥ k′[bc] + k′[ac]. (5)
Similarly, we have NRbc ⊆ (NRbc ∩N[ab])∪ (NRbc ∩N[ac])∪{1}. By bPmc, |NRbc| >
|NRcb|. Thus, from (2) and (4) we obtain
k[ab] + k
′
[ac] ≥ k′[ab] + k[ac]. (6)
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Summing up (5) and (6) yields
k[ab] + k[bc] ≥ k′[ab] + k′[bc]. (7)
Note that if (5) or (6) holds with strict inequality, then (7) holds with strict
inequality.
We have NRac ⊆ (NRac ∩N[ab]) ∪ (NRac ∩N[bc]) ∪ {1}. If aP1c, then from (7)
we obtain |NRac| > |NRca| and aPmc, the desired conclusion.
If bP1a, then the inequality of (5) remains valid when adding two to the
right hand side. Thus, by summing up this inequality and (6) we obtain
k[ab] + k[bc] ≥ k′[ab] + k′[bc] + 2, which implies |NRac| > |NRca| and aPmc, the
desired conclusion.
Similarly, if cP1b, then the inequality of (6) remains valid when adding
two to the right hand side. Thus, by summing up this inequality and (5) we
again obtain k[ab] + k[bc] ≥ k′[ab] + k′[bc] + 2 and aPmc, the desired conclusion.
This exhausts all possible cases2 and Rm is quasi-transitive on {a, b, c} if S
satisﬁes (n− 1) DP for {a, b, c}.
Second, suppose that S satisﬁes (n− 2) EPDP for the triple {a, b, c} and
S does not satisfy (n − 1) DP for {a, b, c} (otherwise we use the previous
proof to conclude that Rm is quasi-transitive). Then S satisﬁes (n − 2) DP
and because S violates (n− 1) DP, we must have |N f{a,b,c}| = 2. Without loss
of generality, let N f{a,b,c} = {1, 2}.
Note that NRab\{1, 2} = (NRab ∩ N[bc]) ∪ (NRab ∩ N[ac]) and NRba\{1, 2} =
(NRba ∩N[bc])∪ (NRba ∩N[ac]). By aPmb, |NRab| > |NRba|. Thus, if aP1b and aP2b,
then 2 + k[bc] + k[ac] > k
′
[bc] + k
′
[ac] and
2 + k[bc] − k′[bc] > k′[ac] − k[ac]. (8)
Note that k[bc] + k
′
[bc] = n[bc]. Thus, k[bc] − k′[bc] is even if n[bc] is even and
k[bc] − k′[bc] is odd if n[bc] is odd. The same is true for k′[ac] − k[ac]. Since S
satisﬁes (n−2) EPDP, n[bc] and n[ac] are either both even or both odd. Thus,
in (8) the left hand side and the right hand side are either both even or both
odd and the weak inequality remains true when adding two to the right hand
side. Hence, if aP1b and aP2b, then
k[bc] − k′[bc] ≥ k′[ac] − k[ac]. (9)
If aP1b and bP2a (or bP1a and aP1b), then similarly we obtain
k[bc] − k′[bc] ≥ k′[ac] − k[ac] + 2. (10)
2If cP1a, aP1b, and bP1c, then R1 is not transitive, a contradiction.
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If bP1a and bP2a, then similarly we obtain
k[bc] − k′[bc] ≥ k′[ac] − k[ac] + 4. (11)
Since bPmc we obtain analogously from (n− 2) EPDP the following inequal-
ities: if bP1c and bP2c, then
k[ab] − k′[ab] ≥ k[ac] − k′[ac]. (12)
If bP1c and cP2b (or cP1b and bP1c), then similarly we obtain
k[ab] − k′[ab] ≥ k[ac] − k′[ac] + 2. (13)
If cP1b and cP2b, then similarly we obtain
k[ab] − k′[ab] ≥ k[ac] − k′[ac] + 4. (14)
We now combine (9), (10), or (11) with (12), (13), or (14).
If (9) and (12) hold, then aP1c and aP2c and by taking the sum of the
two inequalities, we have k[ab] + k[bc] ≥ k′[ab] + k′[bc]. Hence, |NRac| > |NRca| and
aPmc, the desired conclusion.
If (9) and (13) hold (or (10) and (12) hold), then aP1c (or aP2c) and by
taking the sum of the two inequalities, we have k[ab] + k[bc] ≥ k′[ab] + k′[bc] + 2.
Hence, |NRac| > |NRca| and aPmc, the desired conclusion.
If (10) and (13) hold (or (11) or (14) holds), then by taking the sum of
the two inequalities we obtain k[ab] + k[bc] ≥ k′[ab] + k′[bc] + 4, which implies
|NRac| > |NRca| and aPmc, the desired conclusion.
Hence, Rm is quasi-transitive on {a, b, c} if S satisﬁes (n− 2) EPDP for
{a, b, c}. 
An immediate corollary of Theorem 1 is the characterization of the nec-
essary and suﬃcient conditions for majority rule to be quasi-transitive when
agents are allowed to have subjective indiﬀerences (given their objective in-
diﬀerences).
Deﬁnition 3 (n− 2) Unconcerned Agents ((n− 2) UNCA). The partition
proﬁle S satisﬁes (n− 2) UNCA for a triple {a, b, c} if at least n− 2 agents
cannot distinguish the alternatives belonging to the triple, i.e., there are
distinct j, k ∈ N such that for each i ∈ N\{j, k} there is some S ∈ Si with
{a, b, c} ⊆ S.
Corollary 1 Let S = (Si)i∈N . Then the majority rule is quasi-transitive on
the domain RS if and only if S satisﬁes (n − 1) DP or (n − 2) UNCA for
any triple of alternatives.
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Proof. We prove Corollary 1 along the lines of the proof of Theorem 1.
Throughout the proof we ﬁx a triple {a, b, c} of A. Let N f{a,b,c} denote the
set of agents for whom {a, b, c} is free in Si.
(Only if) We show necessity. Suppose that majority rule is quasi-transitive
on the domain RS and consider the triple {a, b, c}. Because PS ⊆ RS , we
know by Theorem 1 that S satisﬁes (n−1) DP or (n−2) EPDP for {a, b, c}.
Thus, we just need to show that if S satisﬁes (n− 2) EPDP and not (n− 1)
DP for {a, b, c}, then S must satisfy (n − 2) UNCA for {a, b, c}. Suppose
that S does not satisfy (n − 2) UNCA. Since S satisﬁes (n − 2) EPDP and
not (n− 1) DP, we must have |N f{a,b,c}| = 2. Since S satisﬁes (n− 2) EPDP
and violates (n− 2) UNCA, we have N[ab] ∪N[ac] ∪N[bc] = ∅.
Without loss of generality, let N f{a,b,c} = {1, 2} and i ∈ N[ac]. Then choose
R ∈ RS such that
(1) cP1aP1b; (2) aP2bP2c; (3) bPiaIic;
and all other agents are indiﬀerent among a, b, and c. Now by construction,
|NRab| > |NRba| and aPmb, |NRbc| > |NRcb| and bPmc, and |NRac| ≤ |NRca| and
cRma. Hence, majority rule is not quasi-transitive.
(If) We show suﬃciency. If S satisﬁes (n − 1) DP for {a, b, c}, then the
proof is identical with the corresponding part of the proof of Theorem 1.
If S satisﬁes (n − 2) UNCA and not (n − 1) DP, then |N f{a,b,c}| = 2 and
n[ab] = n[ac] = n[bc] = 0. Thus, S satisﬁes (n − 2) EPDP for {a, b, c} and by
Theorem 1, majority rule is quasi-transitive. 
Having proved our basic results, the rest of the section is devoted to
introduce a number of relevant qualiﬁcations.
Example 1 Let A = N and {N1, N2} be a partition of N . For all i ∈ N ,
let Si = {{i}, N1\{i}, N2\{i}}. Let S = (Si)i∈N .
If |N | = n is even, then it follows from Theorem 1 that majority rule is
quasi-transitive on the domain PS : let {a, b, c} be a triple of alternatives. If
{a, b, c} ⊆ N1 (or {a, b, c} ⊆ N2), then S satisﬁes (n − 1) DP for {a, b, c}.
Otherwise, one pair in the triple belongs to N1 or N2. If say a and b belong
to N1, then all agents in N\{a, b} regard a and b objectively indiﬀerent (and
distinguish c from a and b) and all numbers n[ab] = n − 2, n[ac] = 0, and
n[bc] = 0 are even (since n is even), i.e. S satisﬁes (n− 2) EPDP.
If |N | = n is odd, then it follows from Theorem 1 that majority rule is
not quasi-transitive on the domain PS : since |N | ≥ 3, there exists a triple
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of alternatives {a, b, c} such that (a, b ∈ N1 and c ∈ N2) or (c ∈ N1 and
a, b ∈ N2). Then {a, b, c} is a free triple for agents a and b and S violates
(n−1) DP for the triple {a, b, c}. Furthermore, all agents in N\{a, b} regard
a and b objectively indiﬀerent and n[ab] = n−2 is odd (since n is odd) whereas
n[ac] = 0 and n[bc] = 0 are even, i.e. S violates (n − 2) EPDP for the triple
{a, b, c}.
Note that each agent’s admissible preferences allow for at least one free
triple (and therefore, for at least n− 2 free triples) and often two agents can
completely distinguish a given triple (more precisely, if a and b belong to N1
and c belongs to N2, then {a, b, c} is a free triple for a and b).
Example 1 has the natural interpretation of a faculty board having to
elect a department chair. Any faculty member is eligible, and usually the
winner has the possibility of accepting or rejecting the election. Suppose the
faculty is objectively divided into two groups, say theorists and applied, that
each voter considers his or her own case as separate from the rest and that
each voter treats all other candidates as members of one of the two groups,
being indiﬀerent between any two theorists or between any two applied people
(other than his or her own). All possible orderings of the three personalized
indiﬀerence classes (oneself, theorists and applied, minus eventually oneself)
are admissible. For an even number of faculty members our conditions hold,
and the use of the majority rule guarantees that the derived pairwise compar-
isons between candidates satisfy quasi-transitivity. If the number of faculty
members is odd, then majority rule violates quasi-transitivity.
When the winner rejects the election, the chair is oﬀered to the candi-
date who is the winner of the majority relation restricted to the remaining
candidates. Hence, it is important that the majority relation yields for any
set of alternatives a winner, i.e., majority rule is a social decision function.
This is guaranteed by quasi-transitivity of the majority rule.3
Our next example is inspired by Dutta, Jackson, and Le Breton (2001)
where a candidate has to be chosen for a position and both outside and inside
candidates are considered for the position. The position could be the head
of a subdivision in a company or an administrative position at a university.
Then the set of inside candidates is the overlap between the set of alternatives
and the set of voters. The outside candidates are the candidates who are not
inside. Inside candidates distinguish between inside and outside candidates.
Furthermore, the chair of the nomination committee (say the department
head) and another representative of the institution (say the dean) are not
3Note that it is not guaranteed by acyclicity for three alternatives of the majority rule.
See Sen and Pattanaik (1969, p. 199).
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candidates and can rank the candidates in any conceivable way, i.e. they can
express strong preferences in their regard.
Example 2 Let A ∩ N = ∅ and |N\A| = 2. We will call A ∩ N the set of
inside candidates, A\N the set of outside candidates, and N\A the voters
who are not up for nomination. For all i ∈ A ∩ N , let Si = {A ∩ N,A\N},
and for all i ∈ N\A, let Si = {{a}|a ∈ A}. Let S = (Si)i∈N .
If n is even, then it follows from Theorem 1 that majority rule is quasi-
transitive on the domain PS : let {a, b, c} be a triple of alternatives.
(i) If {a, b, c} ⊆ A ∩N or {a, b, c} ⊆ N\A, then all agents in A ∩N rank
a, b, and c indiﬀerent and n[ab] = n[ac] = n[bc] = 0. Hence, S satisﬁes
(n− 2) EPDP for {a, b, c}.
(ii) If a ∈ A\N and b, c ∈ A ∩ N , then a is an outside candidate and no
agent is indiﬀerent between a and b, i.e. n[ab] = 0. Similarly, n[ac] = 0.
Furthermore, all agents in A∩N rank b and c indiﬀerent and distinguish
a from b and c, i.e. n[bc] = n−2. Since n is even, now all numbers n[ab],
n[ac], and n[bc] are even and S satisﬁes (n− 2) EPDP for {a, b, c}.
(iii) If a, b ∈ A\N and c ∈ A ∩ N , then similarly as above it follows that
n[ab] = n− 2, n[ac] = 0, and n[bc] = 0. Since n is even, now all numbers
n[ab], n[ac], and n[bc] are even and S satisﬁes (n− 2) EPDP for {a, b, c}.
Another application, where restrictions of the type we proposed do ap-
ply, is Demange (2004). She has studied the distribution of proﬁts from
cooperation in games with hierarchies. Hierarchies are described by a tree,
which describes connections between agents, and by a speciﬁc individual,
among all the agents, who plays the role of the principal. Demange (2004)
shows that if only coalitions which are properly connected can form (she
calls them teams), then the (restricted) core of the cooperative game among
these agents is nonempty and easy to describe. The admissible teams (and
thus, the resulting core distribution) depend on the tree and also on the
speciﬁc agent who plays the role of principal. One may extend the analysis
of Demange (2004) by separating these two ingredients, and by allowing all
possible hierarchies which arise from the same tree, as the principal changes.
In Demange’s interpretation, the tree expresses possible channels of com-
munication among agents. Suppose that these channels are technologically
determined, but that the directions of hierarchical communication may be
chosen. For example, all agents may vote on who is going to play the role of
the principal. Their preferences will depend on the payoﬀs that they will get
in the core, depending on who is the principal (for a given tree). It turns out
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that agents will get the same payoﬀ for all principals who are on the same
branch away from some of their immediate neighbors. That is, preferences
induced by the proposed extension of Demange’s model satisfy (n − 1) DP:
given a triple {a, b, c}, there is exactly one agent for whom {a, b, c} is free,
namely the agent who is located at the median of a, b and c. Hence, the
majority rule would always determine (at least) one winner if agents in that
context would vote for a principal. This example is mentioned to illustrate
that the restriction arises even in rather unexpected contexts. It suggests
that other situations where someone must be chosen to play a special role,
may give rise to similar conditions. Of course, voting is only one of the possi-
ble methods to choose an agent to play a role. In certain contexts, especially
if side payments are possible, these roles may be auctioned (Pe´rez-Castrillo
and Wettstein, 2002). But voting is, to say the least, one of the most pre-
vailing methods to choose agents, and it is good to know about conditions
where its simplest version, simple majority, will work properly.
4 Related Literature
Note that all our properties could have been equivalently deﬁned for pref-
erence proﬁles instead for the partition proﬁle S: for instance, just replace
“for some S ∈ Si, {a, b} ⊆ S” by “aIib”. We chose to state them in terms
of S because then the deﬁnitions are independent of whether we consider
the set of strict proﬁles or the set of weak proﬁles admissible by S. Below
we will refer to the equivalent deﬁnition of our properties for preference pro-
ﬁles when comparing them with restrictions on preference proﬁles made by
previous literature.
There exists a vast literature on domain restrictions and their implications
under diﬀerent rules of preference aggregation. A very complete monograph
is due to Gaertner (2001). The most studied aggregation rule is simple major-
ity, and the standard properties which are sought from the majority relation
are transitivity, quasi-transitivity, acyclicity or the existence of a maximal
element of the relation. Among the many restrictions which have been stud-
ied, the most popular is still that of single-peakedness (Black, 1948). Other
domains were analyzed by Inada (1964,1969), Sen and Pattanaik (1969), De-
mange (1982), and Grandmont (1978).4 Our domains are diﬀerent than any
of those we just mentioned, and they do not seem to have been considered
by the previous literature. We now comment brieﬂy on the analogies and
4Inada (1964,1969) and Grandmont (1978) were concerned with the transitivity of the
majority relation, Sen and Pattanaik (1969) with the quasi-transitivity of the majority
relation, and Demange (1982) with the existence of a maximal element.
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the diﬀerence between our type of restrictions and those proposed by other
authors. There is a fundamental diﬀerence between our setup and all the
others we mention (with the exception of Grandmont’s). In our case, the
set of orders of the alternatives which are admissible may be diﬀerent for
each of the agents. Indeed, each voter is allowed to have at most as many
indiﬀerence classes as the number of members in his partition of objective
indiﬀerence classes. Hence, agents are allowed to have diﬀerent sets of pref-
erences. Under our restrictions, admissible domains are personalized. By
contrast, the classical restrictions we now brieﬂy review do limit the set of
preferences which are admissible, but then allow all agents to exhibit any
of the preferences in this common pool. Inada (1964) considered the case
where each agent can classify the set of alternatives into two groups, and
then will consider all alternatives within the same group as indiﬀerent. He
was concerned with transitivity of the majority rule and showed that if a
proﬁle satisﬁes n DP (for each agent there is a pair which he regards indif-
ferent), then majority rule is transitive. Obviously n DP implies (n− 1) DP
but not vice versa. Furthermore, note that Inada (1964) deals with tran-
sitivity of majority rule whereas we deal with quasi-transitivity and Inada
(1964) did not search for necessary conditions. Our conditions also rely on
the establishment of “large” indiﬀerence classes, but the analogy stops here.
Another interesting set of restrictions were proposed by Sen and Pattanaik
(1969) and Inada (1969). Let R ∈ RN and {a, b, c} be a triple of alternatives.
The proﬁle R satisﬁes value restriction (VR) for the triple {a, b, c} if there
is one alternative in the triple, say a, that is not ranked worst (or best or
medium) by all individuals who are not indiﬀerent between a, b, and c (i.e.
(for all i ∈ N such that ¬aIibIic, aPib ∨ aPic) or (for all i ∈ N such that
¬aIibIic, bPia ∨ cPia) or (for all i ∈ N such that ¬aIibIic, (aPib ∧ aPic) ∨
(bPia∧cPia))). The proﬁle R satisﬁes extremal restriction (ER) for the triple
{a, b, c} if the following holds: if bPiaPic for some i ∈ N , then cPjaPjb for
all j ∈ N such that cPjb. The proﬁle R satisﬁes limited agreement (LA) for
the triple {a, b, c} if there are two alternatives, say b and c, such that bRic
for all i ∈ N .
These restrictions deﬁne domains under which the majority rule and other
forms of binary comparisons will be well behaved. Sen and Pattanaik (1969,
Theorem V) show that a necessary and suﬃcient condition for the majority
rule to be quasi-transitive is that a proﬁle satisﬁes for each triple of alterna-
tives at least one of the conditions, VR, ER or LA. However, in their result
the number of individuals is variable and therefore it does not apply to our
model. Sen and Pattanaik (1969, p. 192) show that any proﬁle violating VR,
ER, and LA for a triple {a, b, c} must include a three-ordering-subset of the
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form [1.1, 2.1 or 2.2 or 2.3, 3.1 or 3.2 or 3.3]:
(1.1) aPibPic
(2.1) bPicPia (2.2) bPicIia (2.3) bIicPia
(3.1) cPiaPib (3.2) cPiaIib (3.3) cIiaPib
Note that when n is even, (n − 1) DP and (n − 2) EPDP only rule out
[1.1,2.1,3.1]. Any other combination is allowed by (n − 1) DP and (n − 2)
EPDP. If n is odd, say n = 5, then (n− 1) DP and (n− 2) EPDP allow for
[1.1,2.1 and 2.3,3.2 and 3.3]. Furthermore, by Theorem 1, none of Sen and
Pattanaik’s (1969) conditions is necessary in our model.
Demange (1982) proposed an extension of single-peakedness based on the
relative positions of alternatives in the vertices of a tree (the original notion
of single-peakedness is based on their position on a line, which is a very
special tree).5 Demange’s proposal bears a resemblance with ours in that
it builds from a set of a priori given connections among alternatives which
can be formalized as a tree. Finally, Grandmont (1978) proposed a notion
of intermediate preferences leading to attractive and quite diﬀerent domain
restrictions. This notion is based upon the possibility of deﬁning when an
agent is in between two others. It requires that, if the two initial agents
agree on how to rank a certain subset of alternatives, than any agent who is
intermediate between them also shares these common preferences.
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